Přehled o publikaci

This chapter investigates the interplay between the economics of productive consumption and positional investing within financial markets. Traditional neoclassical models often overlook how consumption impacts future income and how social positions influence reciprocal relationships among economic agents. A key question is what prevents investment opportunities from being utilized based purely on their rate of return, aiming for an optimal distribution of benefits. The aim is to demonstrate the distinct differences in economic system efficiency when positional investing is present versus absent. It seeks to derive the phenomenon of positional investing deductively from the Pareto optimum definition for investment markets and to provide theoretical tools for its analysis and to address the transformation of property advantage into a tool for discrimination. The research integrates two main areas: the economics of productive consumption (which extends the neoclassical economic model by focusing on consumption that contributes to future production and human capital) and the issue of positional investing (where one subject uses its position to suppress the investment opportunities of another subject). The methodology involves comparing two-component models based on the Nash bargaining problem, applying game theory, and extending microeconomic models of investment fund supply and demand to include investment opportunity generation. The Pareto optimum is defined for both original and extended models. The relationship between cooperative and noncooperative strategies is expressed through two-matrix games, distinguishing them by the type of Nash equilibrium. The research clarifies the contradiction between individual and collective rationality, demonstrating that not every distribution is acceptable to both players. It shows that social status can influence the distribution of market and non-market goods, and that positional investing reduces system efficiency. By transforming games involving positional investing into two-matrix games, the Pareto and Nash equilibria are shown to be distinct, whereas they merge in games without positional investing, making cooperation advantageous. This implies a significant difference in the efficiency of economic systems with and without positional investing. The analysis identifies losses arising from unused investment opportunities by one player due to suppression by another, and from sacrificing resources.