J 2013

What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?

OTÁHAL, T., M. PALÁT and Petr WAWROSZ

Basic information

Original name

What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?

Authors

OTÁHAL, T. (203 Czech Republic), M. PALÁT (203 Czech Republic) and Petr WAWROSZ (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution)

Edition

Národohospodářský obzor, Brno, Ekonomicko-správní fakulta MU v Brně, 2013, 1213-2446

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Článek v odborném periodiku

Field of Study

50200 5.2 Economics and Business

Country of publisher

Czech Republic

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

RIV identification code

RIV/04274644:_____/13:#0000021

Organization unit

University of Finance and Administration

Keywords in English

redistribution system; parallel redistribution game; game theory; corruption
Změněno: 24/3/2017 09:59, Ing. Dominika Moravcová

Abstract

V originále

Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems to account for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, and explain the importance of agents for survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are vital for solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent’s environment (system) and their significance for survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from acting in a corrupted way. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it cannot determine the proper legislation that would deter corrupt behaviour and lead to economic development. For these reasons we investigate if both problems can be explained and solved within the alternative theory of redistribution systems and its part – the theory of parallel redistribution games.