The paper describes the development of financial markets and changes in the nature of economic growth using the theory of c ooperative games. These issues have developed since the early 1950s und er the influ- ence of theoretical problems based on the game theory itself and interacting with real problems outside of the game theory (mostly from ec onomics). It turned out that various applications and contexts correspo nd to numerous possible solutions of standard tasks, e.g. Nash ( S; d ) bargaining problem. Some of the significant solutions are responded to questions arising in the context of social welfare economic theory, respectively is sues are related to the redistribution of wealth between different groups in pop ulation and the rationale of such reallocation. We show that under conditio ns of sufficiently effective financial markets the question of the relationship between efficiency and equality, which is typical of the theory of social welfar e, may be replaced by the question of making full utilization of investment opp ortunities asso- ciated with the acquisition, preservation and application of human capital. We define “sufficient efficiency of financial markets” as ability to fully utilize investment opportunities related – to put it simply – to huma n development, regardless of its initial assets or income position. This is related to the fact that instead of different ways of reasoning for solution ( S; d ) of the prob- lem we can take advantage of technical solution (based on the equality of marginal returns of investment opportunities, or rather ba sed on sum pay- ments maximization), e.g. the solution used in problem of op timal allocation of water (water allocation problem) (Brink, et al., 2011).