N_FLA Fundamentals of Legal Argumentation

Vysoká škola finanční a správní
léto 2020
Rozsah
1/1/0. 6 hodin KS/semestr. 3 kr. Ukončení: z.
Vyučující
doc. JUDr. PhDr. Jiří Bílý, CSc. (cvičící)
Mgr. Marcela Hergesselová (cvičící)
PhDr. Ingrid Vichnarová (cvičící)
Garance
JUDr. Petr Čechák, Ph.D.
Katedra práva (FPSS, KP) – Katedry – Vysoká škola finanční a správní
Kontaktní osoba: Tereza Švestáková
Rozvrh seminárních/paralelních skupin
N_FLA/cBSKV: každý sudý čtvrtek 12:15–12:59 KV211, každý sudý čtvrtek 13:00–13:45 KV211, kromě Čt 5. 3., kromě Čt 2. 4. ; a Út 17. 3. 15:45–17:15 KV211, Po 20. 4. 14:00–15:30 KV206, I. Vichnarová
N_FLA/cBSPH: každé sudé úterý 15:45–16:29 S14, každé sudé úterý 16:30–17:15 S14, J. Bílý
N_FLA/cKPH: každou sudou středu 17:30–18:14 S11, každou sudou středu 18:15–19:00 S11, J. Bílý
N_FLA/pBSKPH: každé sudé úterý 14:00–14:44 S11, každé sudé úterý 14:45–15:30 S11, J. Bílý
N_FLA/pBSKV: každý sudý čtvrtek 10:30–11:14 KV211, každý sudý čtvrtek 11:15–12:00 KV211, kromě Čt 5. 3., kromě Čt 2. 4. ; a Út 17. 3. 14:00–15:30 KV211, Po 6. 4. 14:00–15:30 KV206, I. Vichnarová
N_FLA/vBSKPH: So 29. 2. 9:45–11:15 S32, 11:30–13:00 S32, Pá 13. 3. 14:00–15:30 S32, J. Bílý
N_FLA/vBSKV: So 15. 2. 8:00–9:30 KV310, Pá 13. 3. 17:30–19:00 KV310, Pá 17. 4. 14:00–15:30 KV301, I. Vichnarová
N_FLA/vBSMO: Pá 7. 2. 17:30–19:00 M16, So 22. 2. 8:00–9:30 M27, 9:45–11:15 M27, M. Hergesselová
Předpoklady
There are no prerequisites for this course.
Omezení zápisu do předmětu
Předmět je otevřen studentům libovolného oboru.
Cíle předmětu
The aim of the course is to make students familiar with the very concept of argumentation, functions of argumentation in relation to law and different methods of argumentation. The main objective of the course is to develop and cultivate practical skills directly related to legal argumentation and application of law. Particular argumentation methods should be just briefly outlined. The main emphasis of the course should be put on teaching students to use legal argumentation in practice. The course will be terminated by an academic essay dealing with some questions concerning either the theory or the practice of legal argumentation based on the topics presented in the course. By means of such an essay students should prove their concerning understanding. A satisfactory essay will be graded by a credit.
Výstupy z učení
Student should be able:
- explain concept of legal argumentation
- explain nature of different argumentative approaches
- explain distinction of argumentation by legal rules and by legal principles
- explain concepts: plain meaning rule, golden rule, mischief rule
- enumerate and identify in practice types of falacies
Osnova
  • (1) The Outline of a Theory of Legal Argumentation and the Concept of Law
  • (2) Legal Argument Template
  • (3) Problem of the Justification of Legal Decisions and the Topic Theory
  • (4) Correctness of Normative Statements and the Morality of Law
  • (5) General Practical Discourse
  • (6) Legal Discourse as a Special Case
  • (7) Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumentation
  • (8) Informal vs. Formal Fallacies and Cognitive Biases
  • (9) The Correspondence Theory of Truth
  • (10) Analogy vs. Argument from the Contrary (argumentum e contrario)
  • (11) Argument from a Yet Stronger Reason (argumentum a fortiori) and Argument from Authority or an Appeal to Authority (argumentum ad verecundiam)
  • (12) Argument (Reduction) to Absurdity (argumentum ad absurdum) and Proof by Contradiction
Literatura
    doporučená literatura
  • ALEXY, R. A theory of legal argumentation: the theory of rational discourse as theory of legal justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, ISBN-13: 978-0199584222
    neurčeno
  • Feteris, Eveline: The Study of Legal Argumentation in Argumentation Theory and Legal Theory: Approaches and Developments. COGENCY Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 11-32, Summer 2011
  • Clements, Cory S.: Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumentation: Using Informal Fallacies and Cognitive Biases to Win the War of Words. BYU L. Rev. 319, 2013
  • David, Marian: The Correspondence Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015.
  • Fuller, Lon L.: The Morality of Law. Yale University Press, 262 p., 1977
  • Hart, Herbert L. A.: The Concept of Law. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Oxford University Press; 315 p., 1961
  • Bertea, Stefano: Certainty, Reasonableness and Argumentation in Law. Argumentation, Volume 18, Issue 4, pp. 465–478, January 2004
  • White, Nancy J.: Simple Steps: Teaching Legal Argumentation Using the Legal Argument Template. Journal of Legal Studies in Business, pp. 1-43, 2010
  • Bertea, Stefano: Legal Argumentation Theory and the Concept of Law. F.H. van Eemeren, et al. (eds.), Anyone Who Has a View. Theoretical Contributions to the Study of Argumentation, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 213-226, 2003
  • Bernall, Carlos: Legal Argumentation and the Normativity of Legal Norms. COGENCY Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 53-66, Summer 2011
  • Radbruch, Gustav: Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1–11
Výukové metody
Lectures and seminars in full-time study; tutorials in part-time study; compulsory seminar participation is 75% in full-time study, compulsory tutorial participation is 50% in part-time study. Students who fail to meet the mandatory level of participation may be given during the semester additional study obligations (to the extent that will demonstrate academic achievement and acquired competencies necessary for successful completion of course).
Metody hodnocení
The course is terminated by credit awarded based on evaluation of an academic essay.
Vyučovací jazyk
Angličtina
Informace učitele
Internet links related to the subject:
https://is.muni.cz/el/1422/jaro2008/MP218Zk/um/Radbruch_Statutory_Lawlessness.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argumentation_theory
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/
Další komentáře
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