J 2024

POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS

VALENČÍK, Radim a Ivan VASSILYEV

Základní údaje

Originální název

POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS

Název česky

POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS

Autoři

VALENČÍK, Radim a Ivan VASSILYEV

Vydání

Economy & Business, Bulharsko, Science Events Ltd, 2024, 1314-7242

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50201 Economic Theory

Stát vydavatele

Bulharsko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ne

Organizační jednotka

Vysoká škola finanční a správní

Klíčová slova česky

economics of productive consumption, positional investing, positional investing neutrality function, game theory, Nash bargaining problem

Klíčová slova anglicky

economics of productive consumption, positional investing, positional investing neutrality function, game theory, Nash bargaining problem

Příznaky

Recenzováno
Změněno: 18. 3. 2025 10:23, doc. Radim Valenčík, CSc.

Anotace

V originále

The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of non- cooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games.

Česky

The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of non- cooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games.

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