2024
POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS
VALENČÍK, Radim a Ivan VASSILYEVZákladní údaje
Originální název
POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS
Název česky
POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS
Autoři
VALENČÍK, Radim a Ivan VASSILYEV
Vydání
Economy & Business, Bulharsko, Science Events Ltd, 2024, 1314-7242
Další údaje
Jazyk
angličtina
Typ výsledku
Článek v odborném periodiku
Obor
50201 Economic Theory
Stát vydavatele
Bulharsko
Utajení
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Označené pro přenos do RIV
Ne
Organizační jednotka
Vysoká škola finanční a správní
Klíčová slova česky
economics of productive consumption, positional investing, positional investing neutrality function, game theory, Nash bargaining problem
Klíčová slova anglicky
economics of productive consumption, positional investing, positional investing neutrality function, game theory, Nash bargaining problem
Štítky
Příznaky
Recenzováno
Změněno: 18. 3. 2025 10:23, doc. Radim Valenčík, CSc.
V originále
The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of non- cooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games.
Česky
The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of non- cooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games.