2024
POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS
VALENČÍK, Radim and Ivan VASSILYEVBasic information
Original name
POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS
Name in Czech
POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS
Authors
VALENČÍK, Radim and Ivan VASSILYEV
Edition
Economy & Business, Bulharsko, Science Events Ltd, 2024, 1314-7242
Other information
Language
English
Type of outcome
Article in a journal
Field of Study
50201 Economic Theory
Country of publisher
Bulgaria
Confidentiality degree
is not subject to a state or trade secret
Marked to be transferred to RIV
No
Organization unit
University of Finance and Administration
Keywords (in Czech)
economics of productive consumption, positional investing, positional investing neutrality function, game theory, Nash bargaining problem
Keywords in English
economics of productive consumption, positional investing, positional investing neutrality function, game theory, Nash bargaining problem
Tags
Tags
Reviewed
Changed: 18/3/2025 10:23, doc. Radim Valenčík, CSc.
In the original language
The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of non- cooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games.
In Czech
The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of non- cooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games.