J 2024

POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS

VALENČÍK, Radim and Ivan VASSILYEV

Basic information

Original name

POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS

Name in Czech

POSITIONAL INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE ORIGIN OF CONFLICTS

Authors

VALENČÍK, Radim and Ivan VASSILYEV

Edition

Economy & Business, Bulharsko, Science Events Ltd, 2024, 1314-7242

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Article in a journal

Field of Study

50201 Economic Theory

Country of publisher

Bulgaria

Confidentiality degree

is not subject to a state or trade secret

Marked to be transferred to RIV

No

Organization unit

University of Finance and Administration

Keywords (in Czech)

economics of productive consumption, positional investing, positional investing neutrality function, game theory, Nash bargaining problem

Keywords in English

economics of productive consumption, positional investing, positional investing neutrality function, game theory, Nash bargaining problem

Tags

Reviewed
Changed: 18/3/2025 10:23, doc. Radim Valenčík, CSc.

Abstract

In the original language

The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of non- cooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games.

In Czech

The paper deals with the possibility of applying the concept of positional investing developed in the framework of cooperative game theory to analyse the causes of non-cooperation, the growth of non- cooperation into conflicts and subsequently to analyse the possibilities of conflict resolution. It is based on the theoretical assumptions of the economics of productive consumption, the supply and demand model of investment resources and investment opportunities, which it uses to describe the mechanism of positional investment. It uses the tools of positional investment analysis, in particular the function or line of neutrality of positional investment. Extends the Nash bargaining problem so that the distribution of payoffs in two-player games respects the neutrality requirement of positional investing. Based on this, it presents a concept of the causes of and possibilities for resolving difficult-to-resolve conflicts. To do so, it also uses the identification of interdependencies between certain types of games.

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