What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?

@article{4257,
   author = {OTÁHAL, T. and PALÁT, M. and Wawrosz, Petr},
   article_location = {Brno},
   article_number = {No. 02/2013},
   keywords = {redistribution system; parallel redistribution game; game theory; corruption},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1213-2446},
   journal = {Národohospodářský obzor},
   note = {AR 2016/2017 - odesláno do RIV. (duben 2017)},
   title = {What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?},
   volume = {Vol. 13},
   year = {2013}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 4257
AU  - OTÁHAL, T. - PALÁT, M. - Wawrosz, Petr
PY  - 2013
TI  - What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?
JF  - Národohospodářský obzor
VL  - Vol. 13
IS  - No. 02/2013
SP  - 92-107
EP  - 92-107
PB  - Ekonomicko-správní fakulta MU v Brně
SN  - 12132446
N1  - AR 2016/2017 - odesláno do RIV. (duben 2017)
KW  - redistribution system
KW  - parallel redistribution game
KW  - game theory
KW  - corruption
N2  - Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems to account for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, and explain the importance of agents for survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are vital for solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent’s environment (system) and their significance for survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from acting in a corrupted way. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it cannot determine the proper legislation that would deter corrupt behaviour and lead to economic development. For these reasons we investigate if both problems can be explained and solved within the alternative theory of redistribution systems and its part – the theory of parallel redistribution games.
ER  - 

OTÁHAL, T., M. PALÁT a Petr WAWROSZ. What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption? \textit{Národohospodářský obzor}. Brno: Ekonomicko-správní fakulta MU v Brně, Vol. 13, No. 02/2013, s.~92-107. ISSN~1213-2446. 2013.